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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
since jury trial on the legal aspect is affirmatively guaranteed,
such issues should be tried before a jury, with leave to the court
to disregard the findings insofar as the equitable phase may
later become separable. Thus, in a case where plaintiff asks
both damages for past trespasses and an injunction against fu-
ture ones, the question of whether there has been a trespass will
have significance as to both types of relief asked. It is sub-
mitted that the issue should be tried before a jury, because of
the affirmative guarantee applicable to the legal aspect of the
case.
Had the Court followed the broad suggestions of the early
cases, Montana might today have a rule similar to the one recom-
mended here; as it is, the rule may still be adopted. The cases
in which the point has been raised are not so numerous that the
doctrine to be adopted can be said to be firmly fixed in our law.
The time is at hand for a thorough examination of the whole
question.
Glen W. Clark.
OLEOMARGARINE AND THE CONSTITUTION
The recent case of Brackman v. Kruse, Com'r. of Agricul-
ture, et al. (Westlake et al, interveners),' brought the Montana
Supreme Court to grips with the oleomargarine problem for the
second time. Over a third of a century ago, in State v. Ham-
mond Packing Co.,2 the Montana Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of a statute which imposed a one cent per pound tax on oleo-
margarine. Its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
the United States Today's Court, however, declared uncon-
stitutional and void so much of Section 2620.45 R.C.M. 1935, as
imposes license fees of $250 per quarter upon wholesale dealers
in oleomargarine and $100 per quarter upon retail dealers in
that product.
The statute was attacked by the proprietor of two retail
grocery stores. He alleged, in substance, that oleomargarine is
a healthful and nutritious product; that the license fees were
designed to discourage or prohibit the sale of oleomargarine in
aid of the dairy industry; that the fees were so excessive and
unreasonable as to prohibit plaintiff and more than 92% of the
other grocery stores operating in Montana from selling the
1(1948) ...... Mont ....... 199 P.(2) 671.
'(1912) 56 Mont. 343, 123 P. 407.
'(1914) 233 U.S. 331, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 985.
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product; that sections 2620.43 to 2620.46, R.C.M. 1935, inclusive,
purported to have been enacted in the exercise of the police pow-
er, yet the excessive license fees provided for in effect prohibited
the carrying on of a legitimate, profitable industry and the sale
of a healthful, nutritious food and that such prohibition was not
necessary for the protection of the public health, morals, safety,
or welfare, all in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution and of Sections 3 and 27 of Article III and Sec-
tions 1 and 2 of Article XII of the State Constitution. Plaintiff
sought a declaratory judgment.
The Attorney General contended that the statute was a rev-
enue measure and that it was for the legislature to determine
the amount of the fee.
Various dairymen and buttermakers intervened and con-
tended that the statute was an exercise of the police power but
that it was a valid exercise thereof. They also challenged the
plaintiff's allegation that oleomargarine was a healthful and
nutritious product.
The Court found that Section 2620.45 was enacted as an
exercise of the police power; that a state could not, by the exer-
cise of that power, prohibit a legitimate business or create a
monopoly in favor of one branch of industry handling food prod-
ucts and against another branch of industry handling equally
wholesome articles of food; and, finally, that Section 2620.45
had this effect and thus conflicted with "the fundamental law
of the land."
AN ANALYSIS OF PRIOR OLEOMARGARINE
LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
Oleomargine has been the subject of legislative considera-
tion since soon after its introduction into this country from
France in 1873." The first state laws5 were regulatory in char-
acter but, because of unsanitary manufacturing conditions and
the prevalence of adulteration and deception of consumers by
"palming off" the product as butter, many of the legislatures
adopted statutes which were prohibitory in character. These
prohibitory measures either banned the sale of all oleomargarine
or made illegal the sale of yellow oleomargarine.
'Mege-Mouries discovered the product in 1870 when looking for a sub-
stitute for butter. 17 ENcyc. Bart. (11th Ed. 1911) 704, art. "Oleomar-
garine."
'See Pa. Laws 1878, p. 87.
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The statutes prohibiting completely the sale of oleomar-
garine met varying results before the state courts. The Mis-
souri Court sustained such a statute in 1882.' New York reached
a contrary result in People v. Marx,' decided in 1885. Tlhe New
York Court based its disapproval on the concept that the act
violated the liberty guaranteed by the due process clauses. It
relied heavily upon a previous New York decision8 which had
held invalid a law prohibiting the manufacture of cigars in tene-
ment houses. This latter case would probably be decided other-
wise today under more enlightened concepts of "liberty." The
authority of People v. Marx, from which the Montana Court
quotes extensively, is further shaken by the 1887 decision of the
same court in People v. Arensbergj which upheld a later statute
prohibiting the sale of an article "made in imitation or sem-
blance of" butter.
In 1888 a Pennsylvania statute of this type was upheld by
the United States Supreme Court in the case of Powell v. Penn-
sylvania.' It was there argued that the act violated the due
process clause of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion because it prevented the pursuit of an ordinary calling and
the acquisition, holding, and sale of property. Thus the statute
did outright what it was claimed the Montana statute did by in-
direction and the same contentions, including the claim that the
product was wholesome, were advanced in attacking it. The
Court said.
"Whether the manufacture of oleomargarine or imitation
butter of the kind described in the statute, is, or may be,
conducted in such a way, or with such skill and secrecy, as
to baffle ordinary inspection, or whether it involves such
danger to the public health as to require, for the protec-
tion of the people, the entire suppression of the business,
rather than its regulation in such manner as to permit the
manufacture and sale of that class that do not contain
noxious ingredients, are questions of fact and of public
policy which belong to the legislative department to de-
termine. . . If all that can be said of this legislation is
that it is unwise or unnecessarily oppressive to those
manufacturing or selling wholesome oleomargarine as an
article of food, then their appeal must be to the legisla-
ture, or to the ballot box, not to the judiciary."
'State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110.
799 N.Y. 37T, 2 N.E. 33.
9in re Jacobs, (1885) 98 N.Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636.
"105 N.Y. 123, 11 N.E. 277, 59 Am. Rep. 483.
"127 U.S. 678, 8 S.Ct. 992, 32 L.Ed. 253.
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Another contention advanced was that the Pennsylvania
act denied the equal protection of the laws. In this connection
it was said:
"The statute places under the same restrictions, and sub-
jects to like penalties and burdens, all who manufacture
or sell, or offer for sale or keep in possession to sell, the
articles embraced by its prohibition; thus recognizing
and preserving the principle of equality among those
engaged in the same business."
In 1898 the same statute was again attacked, in &cholle-
berger v. Pennsylvania,' but this time the due process clause
was not relied upon. Instead, the Supreme Court upheld the
argument that the statute impinged on the 'power given to Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce since the law made illegal
the first sale of oleomargarine in the state. In doing so the
court looked to Leisy v. Hardin which had invoked the "si-
lence of Congress" doctrine to declare invalid an Iowa statute
prohibiting the sale of beer within the state. That doctrine,
as enunciated in Bowman v. Railway Co.," states that the "ab-
sence of regulations as to interstate commerce with reference
to any particular subject is taken as a declaration that the im-
portation of that article into the states shall be unrestricted."
Despite the basis of the decision, the Montana Court cites
the Schollenberger case as authority for its due process pro-
nouncements. At least one other court has made the same
error. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Jelko Co. v. Emery,"
stated that the dissent in the Powell case had since become the
law in holding unconstitutional the last of the state statutes
absolutely prohibiting the sale of oleomargarine. The Montana
Court cites the Wisconsin case with approval. However, the
Powell case has been cited and specifically relied upon by deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court subsequent to the
Schollenberger case."
Furthermore, such prohibitory legislation in the oleomar-
garine field is no longer open to the same objection as that
raised in the Schollenberger case. In 1902, Congress passed an
act subjecting oleomargarine which is transported into any
state or territory to the laws of the state or territory, even if
"171 U.s. 1, 18 S. Ct. 757, 43 L.Ed. 49.
"(1890) 135 U.S. 100, 10 S.Ct. 681, 34 L.Ed. 128
"(1888) 125 U.S. 465, 85 S.Ct. 689, 31 L.Ed. 700.
'"(1927) 193 Wis. 311, 214 N.W. 369, 63 A.L.R. 463.
"Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana, supra, note 3; Carolene Products
Co. et al. v. United States, (1944) 323 U.S. 18, 65 S.Ct. 1, 89 L.Ed. 15.
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imported in the original package." A similar statute, ' though,
pertaining to beer, was enacted after the decision in Leisy v.
Hardin, supra, and in In re Rahrer," a case very similar fac-
tually to the Leisy case, it was held that, under the federal
statute, general prohibition of the sale of intoxicants was once
more open to the states.
The result of these decisions and the federal statute leads
irresistably to the conclusion that a state may prohibit, in the
exercise of its police power, the sale of all oleomargarine with-
out violating the due process or equal protection clauses of the
federal constitution and without interfering with the national
power over interstate commerce. However, such has not been
the popular conception of the state of the law, for the states,
prompted by the Schollenberger decision, and abetted by such
misinterpretations of its effect as appear in Jelko Co. v. Emery,
supra, have repealed all statutes of this type.
On the other hand, statutes prohibiting the sale of oleo-
margarine colored yellow met with early success before the
courts and are still in force in many states," including Ron-
tana.' The courts seem to find this a more reasonable means
for the prevention of frauds than is a statute prohibiting the
sale of all oleomargarine.'
Taxation has been the modern device for regulating the
oleomargarine industry, although both Montana and the Fed-
eral Government early adopted this system." For convenience
of discussion, the taxing statutes may be divide. into three
classes: poundage, "domestic fat laws," and licenses. There
are combinations of these.
In 1886 the Federal government imposed a tax of two
cents a pound on all oleomargarine manufactured in the United
"21 U.S.C.A. c. 1, §25.
1726 Stat. 213, c. 728.
"8(1891) 140 U.S. 545, 11 S.Ct. 865, 35 L.Ed. 572.
"California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylavina, South Dakota, Ver-
mont, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
20R.C.M. 1935, §2620.43.
'Mayo & Wynn v. Lovett Grocery Co., (1945) 155 Fla. 318, 19 So. (2d)
867; State v. Hanson, (1912) 118 Minn. 85, 136 N.W. 412; Beha v.
State, (1903) 67 Neb. 27, 93 N.W. 155; People v. Simpson, Crawford
Co., (1909) 62 Misc. 240, 114 N.Y.S. 945; People v. Guiton, (1912) 152
App. Div. 614, 137 N.Y.S. 600.
nSee Par. 13, of Sec. 4064, Political Code of 1895, as amended by House
Bill No. 80, Laws of 1901, p. 144 and R.C.M. 1907, §2763.
't24 Stat. 209.
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States and a fifteen cent tax on that of foreign origin. In ad-
dition it placed a heavy license tax on manufacturers, whole-
salers, and retailers. Manufacturers were required to make re-
ports to the collector of internal revenue, to give bonds, and to
keep books. The forms to be used for packaging and labeling
were prescribed as were the criminal penalties for its violation.
In 1902, Congress amended the acte' and imposed a "split tax."
This law, still in effect with but few changes," placed a ten
cent per pound tax on oleomargarine colored yellow and a
quarter of a cent per pound tax on the product if uncolored.
The license taxes were retained but altered to favor those sel-
ling the uncolored substance. Montana also singled out mar-
garine as a subject of taxation by placing a one cent per pound
tax on all of the product sold within the state." The Montana
tax remained in effect until the act of which it was a part was
amended by Chapter 28, Laws 1933-1934, in such a manner as
to repeal it. And in 1947 eight states!' had statutes imposing
taxes of from five to fifteen cents per pound on all oleomar-
garine sold in the state or on the yellow type only.
Generally, this type of tax has met with success before the
courts despite the fact that, like the federal act, provisions
which might be denominated regulatory were included and
that the tax might be so high that the only point-price--on
which the substitute seems to be able to compete with butter
was destroyed.
The first Federal statute was upheld in In re Kollock." It
was assumed by the Supreme Court that the act could only be
sustained as an exercise of the taxing power, the Federal Gov-
ernment not having general police powers. Despite the use of
the word "regulation" which appeared in the title of the act,
and the provision for criminal penalties for violation, both of
which the Montana Court seemed to rely upon in declaring the
Montana licensing act a police regulation rather than a tax,
the United States Supreme Court said:
"The act before us is on its face an act for levying taxes,
and although it may operate in so doing to prevent de-
ception in the sale of oleomargarine as and for butter, its
primary object must be assumed to be the raising of rev-
'"32 Stat. 193.2'26 U.S.C. c. 16.
"Supra, note 22.
'
1ldaho, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Wash-
ington and Wisconsin.
(1897) 165 U.S. 526, 17 S.Ct. 444, 41 L.Ed. 813.
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enue. And considered as a revenue act, the designation
of the stamps, marks, and brands is merely in the dis-
charge of an administrative function and falls within the
numerous instances of regulations needful to the opera-
tion of the machinery of particular laws, authority to
make which has always been recognized as within the
competency of the legislative power to confer."
In McCray v. United Staes," the federal "split tax" was
held valid. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not
prohibit the imposition of a tax which would destroy a legi-
timate business. It was recognized that the tax would pro-
hibit colored oleomargarine but the court found that it was a
revenue measure on its face and hence a valid exercise of the
taxing power. Again it was assumed that Congress could not
regulate the production or sale of the substance under any
other delegated power so it was necessary to find it an exercise
of the taxing power to sustain it.
Poundage taxes have been attacked also on the ground that
the distinction between natural butter and oleomargarine is
not such as to justify separate classification. In answer, the
Supreme Court of the United States said, in sustaining the
validity of Montana's poundage tax :'
"Apart from interference with commerce among the
states, a state may restrict the manufacture of oleomar-
garine in a way in which it does not hamper that of but-
ter .... It may even forbid the manufacture altogether.
..It may. express and carry out its policy as well in a
revenue as in a police law."
Twenty years later, a Washington statute was a attacked
before the Supreme Court of the United States in A. Magnano
Company v. Hamilton.' It was again contended that the
statute, which imposed a tax of fifteen cents per pound on all
butter substitutes sold within the state, violated both the equal
protection clause and the due process clause of the 14th Amend-
ment. The court held that the difference between butter and
its substitute was sufficient to justify its separate classifica-
tion for tax purposes and that the motive of the legislature in
levying the tax had no bearing on whether or not the tax was
for a public purpose. The court also sustained the Washing-
ton act as consistent with the due process clause, although the
-(1905) 195 U.S. 27, 24 S.Ct. 769, 49 L.Ed. 78.
"In Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana, supra, note 3.8(1934) 292 U.S. 40, 54 S.Ct. 599, 78 L.Ed. 1109.
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operation of the tax had resulted in the extinction of oleomar-
garine sales in that state. The court sustained the prohibition
of what is termed a "legitimate business" by carrying two
propositions to their logical ends: 1) the due process clause
does not prevent the taking of money in the form of taxes,
and 2) if the state has the power to tax, it must also have the
power to determine the amount of the tax and this determina-
tion is normally a legislative function.
Decisions under state constitutional provisions concerning
these poundage taxes are in conflict. In Schmitt v. Nord,' a
1947 decision, the South Dakota Supreme Court followed the
Magnano case in holding valid a statute imposing a tax on all
oleomargarine. In contrast, however, is the decision by a
three-judge Federal Court in Field Packing Co. v. Glenen that
a similar Kentucky statute violated a provision of the constitu-
tion of that state, which the court interpreted as prohibiting
the destruction of a legitimate business by taxation. The Mon-
tana Court quoted from the latter with approval.
A second type of taxing statute affecting oleomargarine
are the "domestic fat laws," in effect in thirteen states.e Such
laws are designed to encourage the use in the product of fats
produced within the state and margarine containing such do-
mestically produced fats are exempted from the operation of
the tax placed on oleomargarine. Such legislation has not yet
been attacked before the United States Supreme Court and de-
cisions in state courts are conflicting as to its validity. The
Georgia Court held it to be a reasonable classification and not
violative of the 14th Amendment or the State Constitution. ' On
the other hand, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held an act
which taxed all margarine except that containing a certain
percentage of animal fat to be invalid under the State Constitu-
tion. Here the classification was held to be unreasonable, the
vegetable oils being equal in every way to the tax-exempt ani-
mal fat. It was not decided whether the act violated due pro-
cess provisions"
.......S.D ...... 27 N.W. (2d) 910.
;(1933) 5 F.Supp. 4 (W.D. Ky.) ; modified, 290 U.S. 177, 54 S.Ct. 138,
78 L.Ed. 252.
"Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Wyo-
ming.
"Coy v. Linder, (1936) 183 Ga. 583, 189 S.E. 26.
"Thorin v. Burke, (1945) 146 Neb. 94, 18 N.W. (2d) 664.
'In a note in 33 Vfiginim L. Rev. at page 640 it is suggested that such
a tax discriminates against interstate commerce and an analogy is
drawn between such statutes and statutes levying a tax on peddlers
8
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In Montana, the oleomargarine industry was faced with
the third type of taxing statute, the license.' Twelve other
states' have employed this device in recent years. In two of
these the licensing acts have been assailed as unconstitutional
before the courts. In the case of Best Foods v. Welch,' the
United States District Court upheld an Idaho statute' which
imposed a license fee of $200 per annum on wholesale dealers,
and $50 per annum on retail dealers, in oleomargarine. The
act made no provision for supervision or regulation of the
dealers, imposed a penalty for violation, and specifically pro-
vided that the fees collected be paid into the general fund. It
was argued that the act was in reality a regulatory measure
and that as such it violated the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses. The Court said:
"The act in issue exacts a definite license fee. It is
significant that this money is placed in the general fund
of the state and appears in the relation of a: taxation
measure, and as such may be sustained, and if for rev-
enue, the Court cannot consider the reasonableness of
the amount. . . The exercise of acknowledged power
may not be scrutinized by the Court. The responsibility
rests upon the legislature, and if unreasonably exercised
redress rests with the people."
As to the equal protection argument, it said:
"The act is not objectionable because oleomargarine is
placed in a class by itself, as there is no relation between
the cow and the butter, and the manufacturing plant
and the oleomargarine, and apart from the commerce
clause, the state may restrict the manufacture of oleo-
margarine in a way that does not hamper that of but-
ter."
However, in Flynn v, Horst,' the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania held unconstitutional a statute imposing a license fee
of $500 per year on wholesalers and $100 per annum on retail-
ers of oleomargarine. It will be noted that the Montana statute
but exempting those selling domestic goods. A statute of the latter
type was held bad in Welton v. Missouri, (1876) 91 U.S. 275, 23 L.Ed.
347.
"Chapter 93, Session Laws of 1929, §40, now R.C.M. 1935, §2620.45.
'California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Mississippi, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont and Wis-
consin.
-(1929) 34 F.(2d) 682.
"Chapter 70, Laws of 1929.
(1947) 365 Pa. 20, 51 A.(2d) 54.
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was a good deal more burdensome than either of these acts.
Under the Pennsylvania act, the proceeds of the licenses were
to be paid into a special fund to be used by the administrative
agency charged with the enforcement of the law. The Penn-
sylvania Court made much of this in declaring the statute to be
an exercise of the police power under which a legitimate busi-
ness could not be prohibited, relying, in part, on the Schollen-
berger case to buttress its conclusion. The Montana Court
leaned heavily upon this decision, bringing the facts in line by
finding a special fund such as existed in Flynn v. Horst. It
did this by pointing out that when Section 2620.45 was passed,
Section 3645, R.C.M. 1921, was in effect and that this provided
that the fees, moneys, and earnings collected by the Department
of Agriculture, Labor and Industry were to be credited to such
department and the claims against that department were then
to be paid out of such fund. Although this law was amended
in 1941' to provide for payment of such moneys to the general
fund, the Montana Court held that Section 2620.45 must be con-
strued as enacted and that the special fund provided for was
in effect the same as the special fund created by the Pennsyl-
vania act.
A CRITIQUE OF THE MONTANA DECISION
It is elementary that a licensing enactment may be either
the exercise of the police power or of the taxing power. The
Montana Constitution gives the legislature the power to raise
revenue by means of licenses. It may also exercise the police
power with the usual limitations. In the Brackman case, the
Court deemed it necessary to inquire whether Section 2620.45
was a regulatory measure enacted under the police power of
the state or a revenue measure. In doing so, it said:
". .. it is clear that the oleomargarine license fee is an
exaction under the police power and therefore the exac-
tion must be limited to such reasonable amount as is nec-
essary to cover the cost and expense of the reasonable in-
spection, supervision or regulation of the sale of such
product by the merchants of Montana."
In many cases it is necessary to distinguish the power be-
ing exercised. For example, a federal court, when examining
an act of Congress, may have to do so for if it is an exercise of
police power, rather than a revenue measure, the act may be
void, Congress having only those powers delegated to it and the
'3Chapter 14, Session Laws of 1941.
10
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general police power being reserved to the states by the 10th
Amendment. Thus, in Sonzinsky v. United States," the con-
stitutionality of the National Firearms Act' was attacked be-
fore the Supreme Court on the ground that it was a regulation
beyond the: power of Congress, an infringement on the police
powers reserved to the states. The act imposed a $200 tax on
each transfer of firearms, firearms being defined as machine
guns and short-barrelled weapons. Regulations were prescribed
for the identification of purchasers. The result, of course, was
to virtually, prohibit a business which was not in, and did not
affect, interstate commerce. It was there said:
"Every tax is in some measure regulatory. To some ex-
tent it interposes an economic impediment to the activity
taxed as compared with others not taxed. But a tax is
not any the less a tax because it has a regulatory effect
. . . and it has been long established that an act of Con-
gress which on its face purports to be an exercise of the
taxing power is not any the less so because the tax is
burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing
taxed .... Inquiry into hidden motives which may move
Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred
upon it is beyond the competency of courts. . . . They
will not undertake, by collateral inquiry as to the meas-
ure of the regulatory effect of a tax, to ascribe to Con-
gress an attempt, under the guise of taxation, to exercise
another power denied by the Federal Constitution ...
Here the annual tax of $200 is productive of some rev-
enue. We are not free to speculate as to the motives
which moved Congress to impose it, or as to the extent to
which it may operate to restrict the activities taxed. As
it is not attended by an offensive regulation and since
it operates as a tax, it is within the national taxing
power. "
Another example of this is the Child Laoor Tax Cases."
Congress had previously banned the transportation in inter-
state commerce of the products of factories which employed
child labor, and this had been declared beyond the scope of the
commerce power." Congress thereupon attempted to accom-
plish the same result by imposing a tax of one tenth of the net
-"(1937) 300 U.S. 506, 57 S.Ct. 554, 81 L.Ed. 772.
'June 26, 1934, c. 757, 48 Stat. 1236, 26 U.S.C. c. 25.
"Specifically, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., (1922) 259 U.S. 20, 42
S.Ct. 449, 66 L.Ed. 817, 21 A.L.R. 1432.
"7Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U.S. 251, 38 S.Ct. 529, 62 L.Ed. 101,
3 A.L.R. 649, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724. This case has been expressly over-
ruled by United States v. Darby Lumber Co., (1941) 312 U.S. 100, 61
S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 614, 132 A.L.R. 1430.
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income of manufacturers who knowingly employed child labor.
This element of scienter was fatal, for the court held that it
made the tax plainly a penalty and "a regulation of the em-
ployment of child labor in the states--an exclusively state
function under the federal constitution and within the reserva-
tions of the tenth amendment."
On the other hand, both the taxing power and the com-
merce power may be available to Congress. This is analogous
to the situation of any state, including Montana, since the state
has the power to tax and license' to raise revenue as well as
the police power. In this situation, in Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins,' the United States Supreme Court said:
"Clearle the tax is not designed merely for revenue pur-
poses. In purpose and effect it is primarily a sanction
to enforce the regulatory provisions of the Act. But
this does not mean that the statute is invalid and the tax
unenforcible. Congress may impose penalties in aid of
the exercise of any of its enumerated powers. The pow-
er of taxation, granted to Congress by the Constitution,
may be utilized as a sanction for the exercise of another
power which is granted to it .... It is so utilized here."
The other power referred to was that of regulating prices in
sales or transactions in, or directly affecting, interstate com-
merce.
At the other end of the governmental scale, but with the
same problems as face Congress, are the municipalities. As is
said in 3 MeQuillen, Municipal Corporations, (2d ed.) 1087:
"As the power to tax and license as a means of raising
revenue is not inherent in municipal corporations, it
follows that such power must be expressly conferred in
plain terms, or it must arise by necessary implication
from powers expressly granted. The exercise of the
authority must be within the clear scope of the language
of the law conferring the power. Grants of this nature
are usually strictly construed against the exercise of the
power and in favor of the public, especially where the
sole purpose of the ordinance is to raise revenue."
Thus, in Montana, it has been held that a city cannot raise
revenue for general municipal purposes by the imposition of
License taxes.' In such instances it is again necessary for the
'Mont. Const., Art. XII, §1.
'(1940) 310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263.
'State ex rel. City of Bozeman v. Police Court, (1923) 68 Mont. 435,
219 P. 810.
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courts to decide whether the license is an exercise of the taxing
power or the police power, since one of the powers may not
exist. It was in this situation, in State ex rel. City of Bozeman
v. Police Court," that the Montana Court laid down a test for
distinguishing between an exercise of the taxing power and an
exercise of the police power when a municipality imposed a li-
cense fee on certain occupations.
There are other instances where the courts may find it
necessary to determine which power has been exercised, since
the constitutional limitations upon their exercise may and do
differ.
Since the Montana legislature has both the power to pass
laws in the exercise of the police power and also to pass licens-
ing laws in the exercise of the taxing power, and since the
question in the case was whether the statute deprived the plain-
tiff of life, liberty or property without due process of law, the
only need for determining which was the power exercised
would seem to be for the application of the constitutional
limitations imposed by the due process clauses of the State
and Federal Constitutions. If an exercise of the police power is
involved, the test, under due process, would seem to be whether
the act is a reasonable means of effecting a legitimate end of
government. In the case of taxation, it is well recognized that
due process does not prohibit the taking of property by that
means.' Whether or not due process limits the amount of the
license tax would seem to be the principal question, if Section
2620.45 were found to be an exercise of the taxing power. On
this point there is dispute. Textwriters say the majority rule
is that, if the police power will support the prohibition of an
activity or occupation, the same result may be reached by taxa-
tion; but that if this is not true an excise tax may not be so
heavy as to be prohibitory, thereby defeating the purpose of
the tax. Under this rule the limits of the taxing power would
be co-extensive with the limits of the police power, the ultimate
test in both cases being the reasonableness of the requirement.
If this rule were followed, then, where a state has both the
police power and the taxing power, as Montana has, there
would be no need for distinguishing, in the case of licenses,
which had been exercised. The court could assume that, if the
"Supra, note 50.
"Due process does demand that the use of money raised by taxation be
restricted to public purposes.
"4 Cooley, Taxation (4th Ed.), §1714; 63 C.J.S., Licenses, §19; and
cases there cited.
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occupation could be prohibited by the exercise of the police
power as a reasonable means of attaining a legitimate end of
government, the same result could be reached by the imposi-
tion of a prohibitive license tax.
However, the majority rule is not the universal rule. Much
of the authority contrary to this majority rule consists of pro-
nouncements of the United States Supreme Court. Its state-
ments, such as that in Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products Co.
v. Smith,-
"Even if the tax should destroy a business, it would not
be made invalid or require compensation on that ground
alone. Those who enter upon a business take that risk",
are probably based upon the now axiomatic statement of Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,' "the power to tax
involves the power to destroy." In the Magnano case, supra,
the Supreme Court reviewed prior decisions on the subject and
concluded that where a tax was within the lawful power of
the legislature, the exertion of the power could not be re-
strained because of the results to arise from its exercise. If
this rule were to be followed and no inquiry into the reason-
ableness of an excise tax were countenanced, an inquiry into
the power being exercised by a particular enactment would
again be necessary. Under such a rule it is apparent that,
while the police power might not support the extinction of an
ordinary occupation because not a reasonable means of bring-
ing about a legitimate end of government, the same result could
be reached by the exercise of another admitted power of gov-
ernment, the taxing power. This result is certainly open to
question. The distinction is a purely artificial one. It is un-
questioned that government may regulate a business in the in-
terest of the public welfare. The means to be used and the
extent of the regulation are questions to be answered by the
legislative department in the first instance. And the govern-
ment may raise money by means of taxation for a public pur-
pose, and again the extent of a tax law is, in the first instance,
a legislative question. Should not the exercise of either power
be subject to the same final test before the courts-namely is it
reasonable, with every presumption being in favor of the leg-
islative determination? It is submitted that the textwriters
state not only the majority rule but the better rule.
Under this analysis, it is apparent that there could be but
" (1921) 255 U.S. 44, 41 S.Ct. 219, 65 L.Ed. 489.
'6(1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579.
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one reason for the Montana Court to find it necessary to dis-
tinguish the power being exercised. It must deem itself bound
to accept the federal rule that there can be no inquiry into
the amount of the tax. This conclusion is emphasized by the
opinion of the lone dissenting Justice who found the act to be
an exercise of the taxing power and cited the Magnano case
in support of his conclusion that the amount of the tax was
not open to question.
The court's statement that, "the fee is an exaction under
the police power and therefore the exaction must be limited to
such reasonable amount as is necessary to cover the cost and
expense of the reasonable inspection, supervision or regulation
of the sale of such product by the merchants of Montana," is
hardly pertinent where both powers exist as they do here.
It is submitted that the ultimate question before the Court
in the Brackman case should have been, "Is the virtual pro-
hibition of the sale of oleomargarine a reasonable means of ar-
riving at a legitimate end of government?" If so, the fact that
the same result is accomplished by taxation rather than regula-
tion matters not. If not, the fact that the act is a revenue
measure should not save it.
That the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to
the Federal Constitution does not prevent the prohibition of
sales of oleomargarine is clear from the never-overruled deci-
sion in Powell v. Pennsylvania, supra. The purpose of the
statute held reasonable in that case was to protect the public
health and to protect the public against frauds, certainly legi-
timate ends of government. That the chapter of which Section
2620.45 forms a part has this same end in view is apparent
from the mere reading of it.' But the Montana Court seems
to feel that because the product is clean, nutritious and health-
ful the act is not a reasonable means of attaining those ends.
It could also argue, although it did not, that there is no danger
of fraud or deception since the product is subject to labeling
requirements by both federal and state laws. Both arguments
have been answered fully by the United States Supreme Court
in Carolene Products Co. et at. v. United States," wherein a
56Sec. 2620.43 prohibits the coloring of oleomargarine to resemble butter;
Sec. 2620.44 forbids the retailer to advertise the product in such a way
that it might be confused with butter; Sec. 2620.35 forbids the sale of
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federal act forbidding the transportation of filled milk" in in-
terstate commerce was upheld despite the contention that such
an article of food could not, under the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, be banned from
commerce. The court there said:
"Although it is now made to appear that one evil, the
nutritional deficiencies, has been overcome, the evil of
confusion remains and Congress has left the statute in
effect. . . In dealing with the evils of filled milk, Con-
gress reached the conclusion that labelling was not an
adequate remedy for deception. On the point of the
constitutionality in relation to due process of the pro-
hibition of trade in articles which are not in themselves
dangerous but which make other evils more difficult to
control, such as confusion in the filled milk legislation,
the Powell case is authority for the validity of Congres-
sional action in the Filled Milk Act. . . . In the action
of Congress on filled milk there is no prohibition of the
shipment of an article of commerce merely because it
competes with another such article which it resembles.
Such would be the prohibition of the shipment of cotton
or milk textiles to protect rayon or nylon or of anthracite
to aid the consumption of bituminous coal or of cotton
oil to aid the soybean industry. Here a milk product,
skimmed milk, from which a valuable element-butter
fat - has been removed is artificially enriched with
cheaper fats and vitamins so that it is indistinguishable
in the eyes of the average purchaser from whole milk
products. The result is that the compound is confused
with and passed off as the whole milk product in spite
of proper labeling.
"When Congress exercises a delegated power such as
that over interstate commerce, the methods which it em-
ploys to carry out its purpose are beyond attack without
a clear and convincing showing that there is no rational
basis for the legislation; that it is an arbitrary fiat.
This is not shown here."
At the same time (1944), the Supreme Court held, in Sage
Stores Co. v. Kansas ex -el. Mitchell,. that a Kansas act for-
bidding the sale of filled milk in that state was not violative of
the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court of Kansas had pre-
18Filled milk is skimmed milk artificially enriched by adding cheaper
fats and vitamins and Is sold in competition with the more expensive
evaporated milk. Thus it stands in much the same relation to evapo-
rated milk as oleomargarine does to natural butter, and It has been
similarly treated by legislatures and courts.
"323 U.S. 3Z 65 S.Ct. 9, 89 LEd. 26.
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viously sustained the legislation as not violating either the Fed-
eral or State Constitutions.'
From these federal decisions, it seems clear that today,
even as in 1888, a state may prohibit, through the exercise of
its police power, the sale of an artificially compounded food,
made in imitation of and sold as a substitute for, a natural
food product and it may do so without violating the due process
clause of the Federal Constitution. This being true, there is no
objection to attaining the same result by a prohibitive license
fee. As the United States Supreme Court said, in Qoung Wing
v. Kirkendall,' a case brought up from the Montana Supreme
Court,* "It may express and carry out its policy as well in a
revenue as in a police law."
The Montana court is free, of course, to place a different
construction on the due process clause of the Montana Constitu-
tion than the Supreme Court of the United States places on
the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Under
which constitution the Montana Supreme Court finds Section
2620.45 objectionable is not clear. The legislation was attacked
under both and the court said:
1"... from such unwarranted and unlawful interfer-
ence with their legitimate business the fundamental law
of the land protects them."
Under language this broad the decision could well be sustained
as an interpretation of the Montana requirements of due pro-
cess.
CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court, in deciding the instant case:
1) Should not have deemed it necessary to distinguish
Section 2620.45 as an exercise of the police power in deciding
the case on due process requirements, for, under the better
rule, due process subjects an exercise of the taxing power to
the same requirements.
2) Should have held, under the better reasoned author-
"State ex rel. Mitchell v. Sage Stores Co., (1943) 157 Kan. 404, 141
P. (2d) 655.
-(1912) 223 U.S. 59, 32 S.Ct. 192, 56 L.Ed. 350.
1(1909) 39 Mont. 64, 101 P. 250.
6'That the United States Supreme Court would not take jurisdiction on
certiorari, see De Saussure v. Gaillard, (1888) 127 U.S. 216, 8 S.Ct.
1053, 32 L.Ed. 125; Johnson v. Risk, (1890) 137 U.S. 300, 11 S.Ct 111,
34 L.Ed. 683.
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ities, that the legislature could prohibit the sale of all oleo-
margarine and, in consequence, it could execute this policy by
the use of a revenue measure.
Mack J. Hughes.
THE MODIFICATION OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS
IN MONTANA
R.C.M. 1935 Section 7569 provides: "A contract in writing
may be altered by a contract in writing, or by an executed oral
agreement, and not otherwise." This statute has been the cause
of much litigation in Montana, and because of the hardship
which it produces, will probably continue to be.
In Armington v. Steele,1 the first case involving the statute,
the point was raised as to whether the statute applied to written
contracts which were not required by the Statute of Frauds to
be in writing. The rule at common law is that a contract in
writing, but not required to be so, may be modified by a sub-
sequent oral agreement! In the Armington case the written con-
tract involved a lease for eight months which did not need to be
in writing. The court held that oral evidence of an extension of
the lease to one year was properly excluded, saying:
"The principle embodied in the provision applies to all
kinds of contracts in writing whether they are required
to be in writing or not .... It is, however, a distinct de-
parture from the common law rule, which permitted par-
ties, at their pleasure, to alter by oral agreement, whether
executed or executory, any contract which was not re-
quired 'to be evidenced by a writing. The only exception
recognized is the cases in which the subsequent oral agree-
ment has been executed by one or both of the parties."
Since this early case the Montana courts have applied this rule
without the point being expressly raised! California, from which
Montana borrowed this statute, apparently reaches the same re-
sult.'
Section 7569 states that a contract in writing may be modi-
fied by an executed oral agreement. In the Armington case the
court said:
"The only exception recognized is the cases in which the
1(1902) 27 Mont. 13, 69 P. 115.
'2 WrsJTSroN, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1936) §591, p. 1702.
'Hurley v. Great Falls Baseball Assn. (1921) 59 Mont. 21, 195 P. 559;
Olsen v. Zappone (1929) 83 Mont. 573, 273 P. 635.
'6 CAL. Jua. §226, p. 377.
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